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Economics as a Conceptual Resource
for the Study of Public Management

工 ntroduction

Four related bodies of knowledge inform the study and
Broadest

practice of public management.

工n

scope

工s

knowledge

about the political processes that place demands , proviàe
opportuni 七 ies ，

and impose constraints on public managers.

Next broadest in scope is policy analysis , which provides the
conceptual foundations and craft skills for determining what
government should do and how it should be done. Organizational
design , a subset of policy analysis , gives insight into how
the public sector can be organized to facilitate the effective
Narrowest in scope , but most

delivery of goods and services.

directly relevant to the practice of

management ，工 s

know 工 edge

about how to carry out executive functions skillfully within
exis 七 ing

organizational designs.

We take the

la 七 ter

two

bodies of knowledge , organizational design and executive
function , as the core of the craft and science of public
management.

工n

this essay we consider what the discipline of

economics offers for research on the core of public
management.
Economics certainly has made fundamental contributions to
the conceptual and technical development of policy analysis.
Through the public choice perspective , it has also contributed
in important ways to the understanding of political processes.
But what has economics contributed directly to public
management?

The short answer is mainly some insight into
1

organizational design.

Of course , being academics , we are not

content with giving just the short answer , especially because
we see some developments in economics that may eventually
contribute to our fundamental understanding of executive
function.
Economists have not been shy about applying their
disciplinary tools to the study of a variety of non-market
behaviors such as crime , fertility , and rent

seek 工 ng.

Yet the

non-market behavior most central to the study of the economy ,
that which occurs within firms , public bureaus , and other
organizations that produce goods and services , has only
recently become part of the mainstream of the discipline.
(工 937)

pioneering work of Ronald Coase

The

on transaction costs as

an explanation for the existence of firms did not attract many
economists to the topic.

More influential was the notion that

in competitive markets only those firms that acted as if they
maximized profits , implicitly choosing the most efficient
organizational form , would survive (Alchian , 1950).

The

assumed efficiency of the "what is" makes the particulars of
organization seem less interesting.

Concern about the optimal

design of information sharing among organizational members
with identical goals prompted some interest in the theory of
teams

(Marschak , 1955).

exceptions

Yet with a few very notable

(Downs , 1966; Niskanen , 1971) , economists tended to

ignore public sector organizations , which usually are

no 仁

subject to the competitive discipline that in theory drives
private firms toward efficiency.
of behavior within firms

Further , early explorations

(Cyert and March , 1963) and the
2

structure of firms

(Williamson , 1975) seemed to many

economists to stray too far from the dominant neoclassical
paradigm of constrained optirnization by

rat 工 onal

actors.

It

was only with the introduction of the principal-agent
frarnework , which preserved the core assurnptions of
neoclassical economics , that questions of organizational
design have moved into the mainstream of economics.
For purposes of this essay , we delineate econornics as the
body of theory and related ernpirical research that relies on
the comparison of equilibria resulting from the choices of
individuals with stable preferences who act rationally to
maximize their welfare.

These concepts -- stable preferences ,

rational choices by individuals , and comparable equilibria -comprise the core assumptions of neoclassical economics.

In

its simplest and most simplistic form , neoclassical economics
adds the peripheral assumptions of the budget as the only
relevant constraint , perfect
exchange.

informatio 口，

We follow Thrainn Eggertsson

and costless market

(工 990)

in classifying

models that preserve the core assumptions of neoclassical
economics , but relax the secondary assumptions , as belonging
In particular ,

to neoinstitutional economics.

neoinstitutional economics introduces rnore detailed
specifications of the situational constraints that individuals
face , of the types of inforrnation that they have , and of the
nature of the interactions in which they engage.

The

increasing specificity of these peripheral assumptions pushes
econornic theory closer to topics of concern to students of
public rnanagement.
法

One can imagine two routes by which economics can
influence public management.

First ,

publ 工 c

managers can draw

concepts and analytical techniques directly from economics.
By understanding the economic aphorism , "the
gets the rent , "

or

七 he

scarces 七

resource

broadly applicable concepts of moral

hazard and adverse selection , for example , a manager may be
better able to avoid ineffective organizational designs.
Familiarity with the techniques of benefit-cost analysis may
enable a manager to pursue more skillfully what Michael
Barzelay (1992)

calls the post-bureaucratic paradigm

emphasizing the consumer perspective , net rather than gross
values , and the inclusion of nonpecuniary costs

(p.

工 21)

.

Second , economics can indirectly influence public managers by
providing the conceptual frameworks employed by public
managemen 七

researchers.

With respect to organizational

design , for instance , such concepts as sustainable
competition , contestability , and credible commitment may
suggest very different ways of thinking about the delivery of
services.

An economic theory of institutions based on

equilibria in repeated games may provide a clear conceptual
foundation f o r thinking about such elusive phenomena as
leadership and organizational culture.
工n

this essay we speak more to researchers than

practitioners.

Rather than attempting to catalogue the

concepts and techniques that are potentially useful to
practitioners systematically , we provide examples of important
general concepts that might be usefully transferred from
. various economic approaches to the substantive problems of
4

public management.

Though most of these concepts are relevant

to issues of organizational design , a few may be useful in
helping to understand the executive function better.
We begin by considering the concept of market failure in
neoclassical economic theory.

Next we

rev 工 ew

the agency

theory and transaction cost branches of neoinstitutional
economics.

Though

subs 七 ant 工 vely

more often thought of as the

domain of political science , we consider the application of
social choice theory to organizational decision making.
Finally , we turn to game theoretic models of institutions ,
which provide a new sort of "general equilibrium" in that they
can explain the existence of conventions and adherence to
rules without resort to external authority.

Neoclassical Economic Theory
The ideal paradigm of neoclassical economics , the ArrowDebreu

(工 954)

general

equ 工 l 工 brium

framework , simply assumes

all production occurs within technically efficient firms that
Thus , it does not speak to questions of

maximize profits.

interest to students of public management.
of the

normat 工 ve

工 mplicat 工 ons

Yet consideration

of the violation of the

assumptions of the ideal neoclassical paradigm , the subject of
welfare

econom 工 cs ，

does offer some concepts of relevance to

organizational design.

In particular , the traditional market

failures -- public goods , externalities , natural monopoly , and
information asymmetry -- can be very useful in diagnosing the
sort of intra-organizational problems that public managers
routinely face.
5

The fundamental welfare theorem , which formalizes the
notion of the "invisible hand ," serves as the basis for
normative

neoc 工 assical

economics.

工t

says that , in an

idealized economy satisfying certain assumptions about
consumer preferences , production technology , the nature of
goods and factor inputs , information , and the existence of
competitive markets , an equilibrium in prices and quantities
of goods and factors exists and that it is Pareto efficient. 1
That is , it

wou 工 d

not be possible to find a reallocation that

would make someone better off without making anyone else worse
off.
Certain violations of the assumptions of the fundamental
welfare theorem , which can be analyzed within the neoclassical
framework , comprise the traditional market failures that lie
at the operational heart of welfare economics.

They involve

situations in which rational behavior by individuals results
in equilibria that are not Pareto efficient in the sense that
alternative allocations can be identified that could make at
least some people better off without

mak 工 ng

anyone else worse

off.
An

economic approach to policy analysis seeks market

failures as rationales for affirmative public policy.
Further , associated with each of the market failures are a
number of generic

IIS0 工 utions"

that provide starting points for
For example , in situations

designing policy alternatives.

involving externalities , characterized by a gap between
marginal private costs and marginal social costs , one generic
solution is for government to impose a tax or provide a
6

subsidy that closes the gap.

Other generic solutions to

externality problems include direct regulation of the activity
generating the externality and allowing those who bear a
negative externality to seek compensation through tort from
those who generate it.
marke 七

failures

Thus , framing

pol 工 cy

problems as

naturally leads the analyst to candidate

solutions.
Though welfare economics frames these failures in the
neoclassical world of market exchange , we believe that they
provide a useful conceptual resource for understanding
behavior within organizations , and , therefore , potentially
offer insight into effective organizational
intermed 工 ate

The production and exchange of

des 工 gn

and more.

products among

organizational members , and the production and delivery of
final products to the customers of the organization , can be
viewed as occurring in intra-organizational markets.

This may

strike some readers as a bit curious as one explanation for
七 he

existence of hierarchial organizations is that they are

responses to market failures that make spot transactions
unsatisfactory.

Organizations substitute to some extent

hierarchies of authority for market exchange.

Members subject

themselves to hierarchical authority in return for an ongoing
rela 七 ionship

providing some package of monetary and non-

monetary compensation.

Yet , because the direct exercise of

authority is costly in terms of

specifyin弓，

monitoring , and

enforcing directives , organizations typically delegate
considerable discretion to their members.

Thus , in many

spheres of organizational life , members are free to purse
7

their self-interest within very broad constraints.
occurr 工 ng

interactions can be thought of as

工n

Their

organizational

markets where expenditures of time and effort are generally
the relevant prices.
d 工 st 工 nction

This perspective makes the

and hierarchies less significant.

Markets embody some

hierarchy -- typically a

cen 七 rally

rights , but also perhaps

var 工 ous

agencies.

between markets

enforced system of property

regula 七 ion

by government

Within hierarchical organizations considerable

discretion is often delegated to people whose behavior can be
self- 工 nterest

understood as the pursuit of
administrative

constraints.

工 ndeed ，

subject to various

the boundaries of

hierarchical organizations become blurred when they contract
with non-members for the provision of services.
We develop the organizational market
more systematically elsewhere
工 3 工-工 38;

Vining and

only a few

(Weimer and

Weimer ，工 990

illustrations

工n

fa 工 lure

framework

V 工 n 工 ng ，工 992 ，

and 1993).

pp.

We offer here

an effort to convey the usefulness

of this approach as a conceptual resource for diagnosing and
managing organizational problems.
Achieving a favorable organizational reputation.

A

favorable reputation is valuable to both the organization and
its members.

A reputation for customer service may enable a

private firm to expand its market; a reputation for competence
and efficiency may enable a government bureau to secure more
resources and greater jurisdiction from its political
sponsors.

Organizational members may find their job easier

and more pleasurable when their organization has a favorable
8

reputation.

Nevertheless , departments of motor vehicles and

many other organizations we routinely encounter have
difficulty establishing and maintaining favorable reputations.
The reason is that reputation is a public good for the
organizational members.
A private good is rivalrous

at a time)

and excludable

control over its use).

(only one person can use it

(a particular person has exclusive

A pure public good like organizational

reputation is neither rivalrous

(new members benefit from the

reputation without reducing its benefits to
nor excludable

ex 工 sting

members)

(short of expulsion from the organization , no

member can be excluded from its benefits).

The chronic

problem of pure public goods is undersupply.
Members of organizations typically produce both private
and public goods.
monitor

一-

The production of private goods is easy to

number of cases processed , dollar value of sales ,

units of product delivered.

The production of public goods is

typically much more difficult to monitor -- courtesy to
customers , extra effort to solve a customer's or colleague's
problem , reliability of final and intermediate products.
Organizational reward systems are typically based only on
private good production because of these differences in the
ease of monitoring.
In order to elicit supply of an organizational public
good , managers must find ways of either rewarding actions that
contribute to it or penalizing actions that undermine it.
Making public examples of reputation-enhancing and reputationdetracting actions that come to the manager's attention is one
~

approach.

An other

approach is to make the discovery of

examples more systematic through soliciting or sampling
customer opinions about the quality of the performance of
organizational members.

In situations in which co-workers can

act 工 ons ，

observe each other's

they may be involved in the

monitoring and rewarding process through such devices as
"quality

c 工 rcles."

The general point is that managers should

expect organizational public goods to be undersupplied without
some

sor 七

of

authoritative

工 ntervention

to encourage

prov 工 S 工 on.

We assume that managers are willing to expend effort to
organizat 工 onal

increase the supply of

publ 工 c

goods.

The

managers of government bureaus with monopoly positions ,
however , may not be willing to put effort into increasing
organizationa 工

public

goods , because they do not have to

compete for customers.

Further , civil service may make it

difficult for them to create incentives to motivate workers to
provide public goods.

Thus , relative to private

organizations , government bureaus are likely to have lower
levels of organizational public goods like favorable
reputat 工 on.

Overuse of resources.

Often organizational resources

such as secretarial capacity , the time of employees with
specialized skills , and shared computer systems are overused
and eventually depleted or degraded.
when the goods have the

characterist 工 c

they are rivalrous but not excludable.

Overuse usually occurs
of common property:
The generic solution

to common property problems is to convert them to private
10

goods by introducing excludability through such means as
establishing user prices or giving "property rights" over use
to a specific person.
Consider the case of a shared computer
qui 七 e

system.

工t

is

possible that at the time the systern was introduced into

the organization , demand for

comput 工 ng

at zero price was

sufficiently low so that no queuing occurred.

As the

organization grows , however , demand grows sufficiently to
create queuing and other degradations of service.
solution is to introduce

fees to discourage relatively low-

valued uses so that

rema 工 n 工 ng

queuing.

effect 工 ve ，

But to be

A natural

users do not bear the costs of
the fees must be denorninated in

units that have some other value to organizational rnembers.
Unless unspent funds in individual computer budgets can be
used Íor other things of

value

七o

organiza 七 ional

mernbers , such

as equipment or travel , they will have no incentive to spend
less than the full amount on

computing.

工 ndeed ，

if they

anticipate that subsequent allocations will depend on current
spending , then they have an incentive to be sure that they
spend t h e entire account.

Though the aggregate amount of

budget allocations can be set to avoid queuing , sufficient
information to provide individual budgets to facilitate most
valued uses is unlikely to be available.

The result may be

inefficiency in excess of that caused by queuing.
Government bureaus typically face more severe constraints
in establishing fungible budgets than do private firms.

Line

item budgeting and constraints on the conversion of unused
organizational resources to private income preclude designs
11

available to private firms.

Nevertheless , one of the thrusts

of "reinventing government" is to allow at least managers to
have fungible budgets

(Osborne and Gaebler ,

1992: 工工 9

-122).

As

we discuss later , however , such systems suffer from a lack of
credibility.
Natural resources owned as common property often are
depleted.

Yet the users of common property resources

sometimes develop governance systems that , while not
necessarily achieving efficient utilization levels , preserve
the resources over extended periods.

Based on the observation

of a large number of common property resources , Elinor Ostrom
(1990)

has distilled a number of design principles that seem

to characterize those that are long-enduring.

For example ,

such factors as mutual monitoring by users , participation in
the determination of appropriation rules by all users , and the
fitting of appropriation rules to local conditions appear to
contribute to longevity.

Transferring these design principles

to organizational common property suggests that allowing
workgroups to set rules for their use might be a promising
approach to preventing their degradation.
Undersupply of specialized resources.

As a final

illustration , consider a situation in which an organization
relies on a particular member for expertise in an area such as
law , accounting , or engineering.

Supply of the in-house

expertise may have the characteristics of a natural monopoly:
over the relevant range of demand for the expertise the
average cost of its provision is falling because demand can be
accommodated by a single person ‘
12

The cost of the expert's

emp10yment contract can be thought of as a fixed costi the
inconven 工 ence

manageria1 effort and user

invo1ved in inducing

the expert to de1iver the expertise can be thought of as the
variab1e cost.

Natura1 rnonopo1ists have

restrict supp1y in order to

dr 工 ve

up

an

pr 工 ce

工 ncentive

to

and gain rents.

The monopo1y supp1ier of organizationa1 expertise may
simi1ar1y restrict

effor 七

to

enjoy an easier 1ife or obtain

rents , though the higher "price" that resu1ts may be
manifested as deference , queuing , or even bribes of some sort.
工n

recent years the concept of contestabi1ity has been

introduced to the study of natura1 monopo1y (Baumo1 , Panzar
and Wi11ig , 1982).

A monopo1y is contestab1e if there are

potentia 1 a1ternative supp1iers of the

good.

工t

is not

contestab1e if there are barriers to entry , such as cost1y
organization-specific investments in human capita1 that have
substantia11y 1ess va1ue in other uses.
con 七 estab1e ，

prices to

then the

d 工 scourage

monopo1 工 st

takeovers.

If the monopo1y is

can be expected

to

工 imit

If it is not , then the

monopo1ist can raise price to maximize rent without concern
about 10ss of the monopo1y.
工 ncreasing

the contestabi1ity of supp1y is one strategy

for managers to improve the performance of monopo1y supp1iers
within their organizations.

For examp1e , barriers to entry

may be 10wered by creating circumstances , such as task forces
and

apprent 工 ceships ，

information to other

in

wh 工 ch

the monopo1y supp1ier revea1s

organ 工 zationa1

members.

Resistance to

such strategies often appear as "turf wars" with members who
enjoy monopo1y positions guarding the information and
13

authorities that function as barriers to entry.
In situations involving the supply of a specialized
resource by a group of organizational members , they may
collude to obtain monopoly rent for the group as a whole.

A

well-known example is the account provided by Michel Crozier
(工 964)

of French mechanics who used intimidation and sabotage

to prevent others from acquiring or exercising expertise
concerning factory machines.

Managers may try to break up

such cartels by weakening the social relations among the
colluders , say by dispersing them to line units rather than
keeping them as a staff function.

In the creation of

positions in organizations , managers should keep in mind that
job classifications in union contracts and civil service
regulations may be helpful to group members in creating
barriers to entry.
Summary: The underlying importance of info r.m ation
asymmetry.

Information asymmetry arises when some members of

the organization have information that they can withhold from
other members.

Organizational inefficiency results if the

information is withheld when providing it would reduce
organizational costs by more than the cost of its provision. 2
Though we focussed on pure public goods , common property
problems , and natural monopoly in illustrating how market
failure concepts can be useful to managers in diagnosing and
correcting commonly encountered organizational pathologies ,
one of the other traditional market failures , information
asymmetry , was implicitly involved in each of these
illustrations through the assumption that monitoring of the
14

behavior of organizational members by managers is costly.
Indeed , it is the information asymmetry that generally allows
the other market failures to occur in the presence of
hierarchical authority that could correct them through fiat.
The central thrust of neoinstitutional economics is to make
assumptions about information asymmetry explicit rather than
implicit.

Neoinstitutional Economics:

Ownership ，工 nformation ，

and

Transaction Costs
Neoinstitutional economics has developed along two
tracks.

3

Agency theory formalizes assumptions abou 七 the

distribution of property rights and information in the writing
of contacts that define organizations.

Transaction cost

theory explicitly considers the nature of the interaction
between economic agents and its relation to forms of
organiza 七 ion

for governing contracts.

of these theories to

pr 己 C 七 ical

design has as of yet been very

The formal application

problems of organizational
limited.

工n

the case of agency

theory , the formal models have incorporated very simple
assumptions and produced very general propositions , often
without immediately apparent empirical applicationi less
formal models have yielded testable implications concerning
corporate structure and control that have generally been
confirmed by empirical research.

4

With the possible exception

of bargaining models , which have actually developed as an
independent line of research , transaction cost theory has yet
15

Nevertheless , both these approaches

to develop formal models.

provide useful general insight into organizational design.
Organ 工 zations

Agency theory.

can be viewed as

collections of explicit and implicit contracts ,

typica 工 ly

covering periods of longer duration than single transactions
and generally characterized by the incomplete specification of
all contingencies. 5
contracts.

these

Agency theory deals with the design of

工n

particular , it focusses on the

relationship between principals and agents who exercise
authority on their behalf.
Though we normally think of agency theory in terms of
hierarchies with managers as principals and workers as agents ,
ironically one of the seminal works on agency theory considers
just the opposite case.
(工 972)

Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz

propose an explanation for the existence of firms based

on the problem of shirking in team production.

A situation is

characterized by team production when it is costly to monitor
the contributions made by each of the team members to the
group output.

Team members have an incentive to shirk because

they each bear the full costs of their effort but only share a
fraction of the output.

Each team member would be better off

if no one shirked than if everyone did.

Realiz 工 ng

this , they

may decide to hire a manager who can monitor their behavior to
eliminate shirking.
shirking?

But how do they keep the manager from

One solution is to write a contract that pays

workers fixed amounts
of revenue over cost

(wages) and gives rights to the residual
(profit) to the manager.

firm owned by the manager.
工6

Thus results a

At about the same time , Stephen Ross

(1973)

introduced

formal techniques for modelling principal-agent relationships.6
The problem facing the principal is to design a contract that
specifies payrnent to the agent as a function of observable
quantities such that the agent receives some minimal expected
utility and the principal's expected utility is maximized by
the agent's self-interested responses to the provisions of the
contract.

In the simplest formulation , the output produced is

a function of the agent's effort and the realization of some
random variable observable only by a risk-neutral agent.

The

optimal contract in such situations is often of the form of a
franchise:
keeps the

the agent pays a fee to the principal and then
en 七 ire

value of the output.

One of the more thoroughly explored lines of development
of the formal model , which leads to more commonly observed
employment contracts , has involved consideration of the
consequences of assuming that agents are more risk averse than
principals
cases ,

(Stiglitz , 1974 , 1975; Holmstrom ,

opt 工 mal

1982).

工n

contracts typically shift some risk to the

principal but as a consequence agents have lower

effor 七

than they would in the case of risk neutrality.

Other

extens 工 ons

such

cons 工 der

levels

situations in which the principal can

observe a signal correlated with the agent's effort
(Holmstrom ，工 979) ，

multiple agents compete in tournaments

(Nalebuff and Stiglitz , 1983) , agents perform multiple tasks
(Holmstrom and

Milgrom ，工 99 工)，

for other agents

and agents are the principals

(Laffont , 1990).

For non-technical surveys

of the literature using formal principal-agent models , see
17

Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole (1989) , David E. M. Sappington
(1991) ,

and Jeffrey Banks

(1995).

Unfortunately , the formal

pr 工 nc 工 pal-agent

rnodels often do

not provide predictions that can be directly tested
ernpirically (Holmstrom and T 工 role ，工 988: 105).7

Some related

empirical work does offer practical insights into
Cons 工 der ，

organizational design.
Knoeber's

(1989)

for example , Charles

study of the broiler industry that has been

extrernely successful in reducing the real price of chicken
over the last 30 years.

Large wholesalers , called

integrators , typically ernploy tournarnents among sets of
independent

growers.

similar allotments of

工n

each tournarnent growers receive

ch 工 cks ，

feed , and medicine.

The price

they receive per pound of delivered chicken depends on how
efficiently they use the inputs relative to others in the
tournarnent.

The use of tournaments in this industry is

theoretically consistent with forrnal principal-agent models in
tha 七七 he

growers face cornrnon randorn effects due to

temperature , epidemics , and experirnental changes in the
genetic stock of chicks.

It provides a way of reducing these

systernatic sources of risk to growers by generating
inforrnation about their relative rather than just their
absolute performances.
Though some examples of the use of tournaments in the
public sector can be found
1989)

I

(Fong , 1986; Church and Heumann ,

they might be more commonly ernployed to maintain

cornpetition (Weimer , 1992).

Specific applications arise in

the context of dual-sourcing for goods purchased by the
18

government

(Riordan and Sappington , 1989; An ton and

and competitive franchising (Hazlett , 1990).

Yao ，工 990)

The general

design concept for public managers to keep in mind is that
they may be able to generate useful information about
production costs through

on-go 工 ng

tournaments among

contractors , regional offices , or other groups that produce
similar products.
Chistopher Hall's

(1986)

study of claiming races

suggests another general design concept: inducing the
production or revelation of information through the creation
of appropriable value

(Weimer , 1992).

A high percentage of

horse races at North American tracks are claiming races in
which any horse can be purchased

(cla 工 med)

for a set price.

By setting purses sufficiently above the claim price , some
owners will be induced to enter horses worth more than the
claim .

The possibility of the availability of these bargains

induces other buyers to monitor horses , thereby increasing the
chances that switched horses will be detected and reducing the
chances that owners will hold back horses in prior races to
manipulate odds.

Claiming thus reassures bettors about the

accurac y of public inÍormation about horses.
One type of

applicat 工 on

is in the enforcement of laws.

The setting of "bounties" can be used to induce decentralized
enforcement.

Care must be taken , however , to align the

incentives closely to goals or inappropriate enforcement may
result.

For example , because the "citizen suit" provisions of

the Clean Water Act do not tie bounties to the magnitude of
environmental damage , they appear not to be contributing to
19

social efficiency

(Greve ，工 989).

A more worrying example is

the provision in many state forfeiture laws allowing police
departments to keep all , or a large fraction , of property they
seize from people accused of drug-related crimes -- it creates
not only an incentive to go after large asset holders rather
than

major offenders but also an invitation to corruption.
An other application is in the creation of rules that

induce the revelation of information through forced
transactions.

Examples include: generating information about

the costs of regulations by requiring firms to make estimates
of how much a regulatory standard wil1 cost and to pay

tha 七

amount to any outside contractor who can a1ter equipment to
meet the stanèard (Stonselie and

Portney ，工 983) i

and

generating information about the value of natura1 resources
for purposes of taxation by requiring owners to state a value
and sell the resource at that value to any c1aimant.

Though

these particu1ar applications are not necessarily desirable ,
they suggest how thinking exp1icitly about information can
1ead to consideration of organizationa1 designs that might
otherwise be overlooked.
A 1ess formal , but empirically richer , strain of agency
theory focusses on the affect of different structures of
property rights for organizationa1

efficiency.

工t

was

formulated in the seminal article on agency cost by Michae1
Jensen and Wil1iam Meckling

(工 976).

Agency costs inc1ude "the

costs of structuring , monitoring , and bonding a set of
contracts among agents with conflicting interests , p1us the
residua1 10ss incurred because the cost of fu11 enforcement of
20

contracts exceeds the benefits"

(p. 305).

Bonding refers to

arrangements made by the agents to raise the costs of their
For example , in the case of owners as

not complying.

principals and managers as agents , bonding might include the
promise to have audits conducted by independent accountants or
an agreement to hold stock that cannot be sold during the
manager's tenure.

(Blue ribbon advisory panels and

independent internal investigation units may have a similar
function for public managers.)
testab 工 e

produce

The theory has been used to

hypotheses about the relationship between

monitoring costs and ownership structures in such industries
as property and casualty insurance (Mayers and Smith , 1988)
Agency theory also has relevance to the issue of state
versus

priva 仁 e

ownership of organizations.

as the principals for state-owned

Politicians serve

organ 工 zat 工 ons.

to private owners , who can claim the

res 工 dual

In contrast

of the

organization , electoral competition and civil service laws
generally preclude political

pr 工 nc 工 pals

the residual as personal gain.

from

d 工 rectly

taking

Unlike private owners ,

individual politicians cannot transfer ownership to others.
This nontranferability of public organizations discourages
specialization in their ownership , so that less effective
monitoring of management may result
1987).

(De

Alessi ，工 983;

Lot 仁，

Public agencies usually have multiple principals so

that managers may receive conflicting and unstable political
demands

(Moe , 1984).

Further , a principal-agent relationship

exists between voters and politicians encouraging oversight to
discover

sensa 七 ional

instances of fraud , waste , and abuse that
21

wil 工

catch

the attention of voters rather than more mundane

monitoring of the efficiency of routine operations.

These

factors suggest that , other things being equal , privatelyowned organizations will be more efficient than state-owned
organ 工 zat 工 ons.

A theoretically important "other thing" is the degree of
competition that the organization faces in its product
markets.

One way to hold the degree of competition equal is

to limit the comparison of ownership forms to organizations
that sell their output in competitive markets.

Doing so gives

support to the hypothesis that private ownership is more
efficient than public ownership (Boardman and
Vining and Boardman , 1992).

Vining ，工 989;

Differences in the effectiveness

of oversight helps explain why public managers are generally
given less discretion than their private counterparts.
Control can be accomplished through a combination of ex ante
rules and ex post oversight(Thompson and
ex post

mon 工 tor 工 ng

is

rela 七 ively

less

Jones ，工 986).

effect 工 ve ，

When

we expect

greater reliance on ex ante rules such as strict prohibitions
against personal expropriation of organizational resources ,
工 ine

item budgets , and restrictions on patronage.
Transaction cost theory.

As with agency theory , the

focus of transaction cost theory is the contract
工 985).

(Williamson ,

But unlike agency theory , which usually treats agents

as simply reacting to contracts designed by principals ,
transaction cost theory views the
in exchange

part 工 es

attempt 工 ng

to engage

(a transaction) as contracting both the terms of

the exchange and their

execut 工 on.

The contracting
22

process

工S

cost1y.

It inc1udes not on1y the structuring , monitoring ,

bonding , and residua1 10ss costs of agency theory , but a1so
At one 1eve1 , transaction cost

the costs of negotiation.

theory considers the nature of specific types of transactions.
At a broader 1eve1 , it is concerned with which institutiona1
arrangements best
transac 七 ions

Maser ，工 987;

faci 工 itate

and economize which kinds of

(Wi11iamso 口 ，工 985;

Bryson and

Maser ，工 986;

Heckathorn and

Ring ，工 990) .

Doug1as Hekathorn and Steven Maser

(工 987)

identify three

important prob1ems that contribute to the costs of
Firs 仁

contracting.

a

"cooperation prob1em" arises when a

contract cou1d offer a11 parties gain re1ative to the absence
To achieve a mutua11y beneficia1 contract ,

of a c o ntract.

howe v er , the parties must expend
inc1ude

"(工)

the

prerequ 工 S 工 tes

communication channe1s

w 工 th

transact 工 on

for

resources that

negot 工 at 工 ng ，

which to

for examp1e ,

bargain ，工 ndependent

sources of pertinent information with which to assess
competing c1aims , and information processing capacities; and
(2)

the prerequisites for enforcing contracts , for instance ,

the abi1ity to monitor comp1iance and to sanction
noncomp1iance"

(p. 76).

Second , a "àivision prob1em" arises

when different mutua11y beneficia1 contracts offer different
re1ati v e gains.

The parties may expend bargaining resources

and effort attempting to secure more favorab1e contracts for
themse1ves.
comp1iance

Third , a "defection prob1em" arises when non工s

in the

se1f- 工 nterest

of any of the parties.

Because it is impossib1e to anticipate a11 contingencies in
the writing of contracts , parties

somet 工 mes

23

have opportunities

to withhold contributions without being subjected to
anticipated sanctions or to force re-negotiation of terms
through threats of

non-compliance. 。

Transactions often involve investments by one or more of
the parties in specific assets , such as specialized equipment
or knowledge , that have much lower value in uses other than as
part of the transaction.

Parties who invest in specific

assets are especially vulnerable to threats of non-compliance.
Therefore , they may be unwilling to

en 七 er

into contracts

unless they receive credible commitments that other parties
will not behave opportunistically in exploiting their
vulnerability.

A central question of political economy is how

governments can make

cred 工 ble

comm 工 tments

to convince people

that their investments will not be expropriated (Rodrik and
Zeckhauser ，工 988;

and

Weimer ，工 993)

North and

Weingast ，工 989;

Root ，工 989;

Riker

and that the money supply will not be

debased (Blackburn and

Christensen ，工 989).

But the problem of

credible commitment is pervasive at all levels of
←」

.工

o r qda n -L z a

0

n

Return to the problem of establishing fungible budgets
for public managers.
by Osborne and Gaebler

The expenditure control budget advocated
(1992:

工 19-122)

allows managers to

carry unspent funds over from one fiscal period to the next.

9

Transaction cost theory suggests that we should be skeptical
about its use in circumstances in which the manager and the
central budget office do not already have a trusting
relationship.

The reason is that the manager must anticipate

the possibility that the budget office will expropriate the
24

savings by reducing the base budget in the next

period.

工f

this happens , the manager wou1d not on1y 10se the
discretionary use of the savings but she wou1d a1so have
revea1ed information about the true costs of de1ivering output
that cou1d weaken her bargaining

pos 工℃工 on

工n

the future.

What

appears to be needed is some mechanism that makes the
commitment

no 七

to

expropriate the savings credib1e.

One

possibi1ity is to create a sort of "Swiss bank" that concea1s
information about savings from the budget office (Weimer ,
1992) .

The risk of opportunism has obvious re1evance to the
issue of privatization.

Competition may be

very

工 ntense

when

a contract for provision of some service is initia11y put out
for bids.

Once a firm has won the bid , its specific

investments in know1edge about producing the service create a
barrier to entry that makes the contract 1ess contestab1e in
the future.

If 10ss or degradation or the service is

particu1ar1y costly to public orficials , then the firm will
enjoy a favorable bargaining position for renegotiating
contract terms.

Of course , the government can act

opportunistica11y with respect to emp10yees and supp1iers who
make organizationa1ly specific investments.

civil service

tenure is one way for the government to make a credible
commitment that it will not exp10it workers who have invested
in deve10ping expertise with 1itt1e va1ue outside the
organ 工 zat 工 on.

One of the specific assets of firms and units of
government is the trust they engender by virtue of their track
25

records in supplying goods and services.
general

reliab 工工工 ty

By demonstrating a

they create a barrier to contestability

that advantages them in negotiating the terms of contracts
which allow them to operate above minimum cost.

Substitute

monitoring capability for trust may contribute to more
Ironically , therefore , one way to make

efficient supply.

privatization more effective may be to invest in the core
analytical and
(Vining and

manager 工 al

Weimer ，工 990)

Social Choice Theory

and

funct 工 ons

of public organizations

.

工 ntraorganizational

Decision Making

Social choice theory considers the relationship between
individual preferences and social preferences.
General

Possibil 工 ty

Theorem

ra 工 ses

Arrow's

a fundamental limitation to

collective choice: no social choice rule can simultaneously
satisfy minimal conditions of fairness

(there is no

dictatorshipi all transitive preference orderings for
individuals are
every

indiv 工 dual

permittedi

工f

over another ,

one alternative if preferred by
then

工仁工 s

soc 工 ally

the choice rule is not arbitrary in that it

wil 工

preferredi

consistently

produce the same social ordering from the same individual
orderings)

and simultaneously guarantee a transitive social

ordering of alternatives

(Arrow ，工 963).

Most applications of

Arrow's theorem concern the characteristics of
though it applies to any social choice rule.

vot 工 ng

systems ,

In particular ,

it applies to decentralized decision making within
organ 工 zatlons.

The Liberal Paradox of Amartya Sen (1970) , which replaces
26

the

condi 七 ion

non-dic 七 atorship

of

with one of minimal

delegation , gives a result similar to Arrow's when applied to
organizational decision

rnaking.

工 n part 工 cular ，工 f

organ 工 zat 工 ona 工

at least two individuals or

there are

subunits

that each

have the authority to rank order at least one pair of
alternatives , then no decision rule can guarantee both Pareto
organ 工 zat 工 onal

efficiency and transitivity of

combinations of individual preferences.

cho 工 ces

for all

This result can be

seen as a fundamental theoretical limit to organizational
performance

Miller ，工 985;

(Hammond and

Pareto efficiency and

transit 工 V 工 ty

organization can be achieved by
unrestricted preferences.

Mi 工 ler I

工 992)

.

at the level of the

abandon 工 ng

the condition of .

One way to do this is to establish

a clear corporate culture that leads , through selective
recruitmen 仁

to

members

w 工 th

homogeneous preferences.

Doing

so , however , may be at the cost of excluding some types of
expertise that are correlated with excluded preference
profiles.

For example , excluding economists from a

substanti v e line agency may make for a more homogeneous
corporate

cul 七 ure

depr 工 ve

but

in some circumstances.
Miller

(工 985)

the agency of

expert 工 se

valuable

Further , as Thomas Hammond and Gary

point out , the fundamental limitation may

reappear when decision-making authority in a government is
distributed across agencies with distinct corporate cultures.
[Figure 1 about here]
The simple spatial

vo 七 ing

model presented in Figure 1

graphically illustrates the fundamental problem of social
choice and . the potential role of institutional rules in
27
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The horizontal axis represents a continuous

policy dimension , say the size of the social welfare program
budget.

The vertical axis represents a second continuous

policy dimension , say the size of the defense budget.
points labelled

1 1 ，工 2 '

The

and 13 represent the ideal , or most

preferred , points for each of three

leg 工 slators.

Assume that

each legislator prefers points that are closer rather than
1mag 工 ne

further from his or her ideal point.

that the status

quo point is exactly the ideal point of legislator
What do we expect to happen if a

pol 工 cy

two ，工 2 •

combination (x , y)

is

to be chosen by a majority rule vote?
The circular arc centered at 1 1 and passing through the
status quo point is an "indifference curve" for legislator one
in the sense that it represents all the points that she finds
equally satisfactory
prefers any

point

poin 七

The

ideal

to

工 ns 工 de

七 he

status quo.

Legislator one

the arc because it is closer to her

other circle arc similarly represents points

of indifference to the status quo for legislator three.

The

intersection of these arcs , the shaded area labelled WI 2 ,
represents all the points that both

legisla 七 or

legislator two prefer to the status quo.

one and

Thus , if each

legislator voters his or her sincere preferences r
proposa 工

w 工 th 工 n

then any

WI 2 would beat the status quo two votes to one.

The fundamental social choice problem arises because ,
through a similar procedure r we can find proposals that beat
the new

sta 七 us

quo.

There is no

equ 工工工 brium

because any

policy can be beaten in a majority rule vote by alternatives.
1ndeed , Richard McKelvey

(工 976)

shows
28

tha 七

if

one of the

legislators has control over the agenda , he or she can , by
successively proposing alternatives to the previous winning
proposal , eventually secure any point in the policy space
Thus , there is either no

including his or her ideal point.

equilibrium or one induced by giving control of the agenda to
one legislator.
The institution of an "agenda setter" is one way to
induce an equilibrium.

Kenneth Shepsle

(工 979)

began a line of

research that explores the various institutional arrangements
that can induce an equilibriurn.

For exarnple , consider the

delegation of authority to cornrnittees such that each one has
cornplete authority over one of the policy
Figure

工

the

dirnensions.

工n

points x} , x 2 , and x 3 represent the legislators'

ideal points on the single dimension decided by a comrnittee.
工n

this case , the Median Voter Theorern gives

equilibrium.

X2

as the

Sirnilarly , the comrnittee with authority over the

other policy dimension would select Y2 by majority rule vote.
An equilibrium corre sponding to 1 2 would emerge as long as the

committee structure guaranteed that only votes involving
changes in one dimension at a time occurred. l l
Spatial models provide a frarnework for thinking
systematically about political strategy.

William Riker (1986)

describes Heresthetics , the art of political manipulation , in
terms of agenda control , strategic voting (voting against
one's true preferences to obtain a more favorable outcome in
future votes) , and the manipulation of policy dimensions.
Heresthetics can help public managers find strategies for
getting more

favorab 工 e

results frorn the various political
29

arenas in which they
effective

operate.

organizationa 工

工t

can also contribute to more

design.

Consider , for example , the recent success that the
Department of Defense has had in closing unnecessary military
bases

(Weimer , 1992).

Between 1976 and 1989 virtually no

military bases were closed.

But

工n

工 988 ，

Congress delegated

authority for formulating the set of bases to be closed to a
commission.

Congress

further

工 mposed

a closed rule

(no

amendments are permitted) on the recommendations of commission
and exempted the proposed closures from environmental impact
statement requirements that could be used to move the
decisions from the

legislat 工 ve

to the judicial arena.

As a

result of these institutional changes , bases are now being
closed.

Game-Theoretic Models
工口

common usage ,

of

工 nstitutions

lnst 工 tut 工 ons

general 工 y

refer to the

rules of society , whether formal or informal , that constrain
individual behavior.
violating

七 hem

to Figure

1

But why do people obey the rules when

may be in their immediate

, for instance , in the case of

jurisdic 七 ion

in 七 erests?

Returning

commi 七 tee

over policy dimensions , why is it that

legislators one and three do not vote to suspend the rules so
as to be able to propose alternatives they find desirable to
the status quo?

Resorting to some external authority , such as

judicial interpretation of a constitution , gives only a
partial answer because it raises the question of why the
external authority is accepted.

The most general theory of
30

institutions should explain why a set of rules is constraining
without
the

resor 七

ru 工 es

to

In other words ,

some external authority.

comprising the institution should be self-enforcing

in the sense that individuals voluntarily accept them.
The elements of an economic theory of institutions that
meets these requirements were introduced by An drew Schotter
(1981) ,

who views institutions , including such informal rules

as conventions and norms , as
noncooperative games.

equilibr 工 a

工n

repeated

A social situation is represented as a

one-stage game involving either a cooperation or coordination
problem so that the equilibrium strategies of the players lead
to an outcome that is Pareto

inefficient.

工f

this stage game

is repeated indefinitely , however , then , with appropriate
assumptiôns about the knowledge and discount rates of the
players , equilibria can result
coopera 七 ion ，

that

工 nvolve

varying degrees of

often including ones that achieve Pareto

efficiency. 斗 2

By far the most commonly employed stage

game

工s

the well

known prisoners' dilemma , characterized by an equilibrium
involving "defection" by both players whereas "cooperation" by
both players would be Pareto

efficien 七.工 f

the game is

repeated such that the players do not know the last period of
play with certainty , then there may be many possible
equilibria that lead to Pareto efficient levels of cooperation
depending on their discount rates , the

probabil 工 ty

that the

game continues from one period to the next , and the payoff
structure of the stage game.

For example , plausible

assumptions often make mutual play of the well known "tit-for31

tat" strategy (cooperate in the first period , then play the
stage-game strategy that your opponent played in the previous
period)

an equilibrium that results in continuous cooperation.

Though most of this literature is at least a step away
from modelling real institutions , one exceptional work shows
the possibilities for application.
North , and Barry Weingast

(1990)

paul Milgrom , Douglass

consider the problem of trade

in the Middle Ages , which was characterized by infrequent
interactions among a large number of traders.

They show how a

cooperative equilibrium involving a third party who keeps
records about contract compliance can result.

The record

keeper corresponds closely to the historical institution of
the law

merchan 七.

David Kreps
工 mportant

(1990)

connect 工 on

and Gary Miller

between the

institutions and leadership.

(工 992)

econom 工 c

make an

theory of

They note that repeated games

generally have multiple equilibria; indeed , the so-called
"folk theorem" states that repeated games can even have an
infinite number of equilibria.

If many different equilibria

are possible , then a coordination problem arises: How can the
players know which strategies to play so that one of the more
desirable equilibria results?

An effective leader provides a

vision of one of the desirable equilibria and communicates it
to the members of the organization.

She thus facilitates

effective coordination by giving mernbers consistent
expecta 仁 ions

about each other's behavior.

Symbols may play a

role in creating the shared expectations; so too might the
personal interaction achieved through "management by walking
32

around."
The importance of the credibi1ity of manageria1
commitments becomes apparent in viewing organizations as
repeated games.

Members must anticipate not on1y that if they

make contributions to the co11ective endeavor that others wi11
as we11 , but that they

w 工 11

not be disadvantaged in future

p1ays because they have revea1ed information that 1eaves them
vu1nerab1e to exp1oitation.
authored with Jack

Mi11er

(工 992)

Knott ，工 11ustrates

七 he

I

in work co-

importance of

credib1e commitment through an ana1ysis of piece-rate
incentives , a contract form favored more by economic theory
than actua1 use.

Work groups , fearing a ratcheting down of'

piece rates and potentia1 1ayoffs , genera11y create norms to
1imit output.

The rare organization that effective1y uses

piece-rates probab1y does so by convincing workers that they
have job security and by giving them a ro1e in the setting of
rates.

A corporate cu1ture consisting of a set of norms about

how workers

w 工 11

be treated , may be va1uab1e in giving

credibi1ity to the commitments by individua1 managers whose
tenure

工s

uncerta 工 n.

Corporate cu1ture can a1so be viewed in the context of
incomplete contracts

(Kreps ,

1990).

工t

communicates genera1

princip1es for dea1ing with unanticipated contingencies and
provides a basis for eva1uating performance ex post.
Maintaining a genera11y valuable corporate culture may explain
what otherwise appears as inappropriate managerial rigidity:
support for its princip1es , even when they 1ead to specific
outcomes that are not in the best interests of the involved
33

Tab1e 1
Overview of Economic Concepts of Potentia1 Use to Pub1ic Management Research
Centra1

Economic Approach

Not 工 on

Area of App1ication

Neoc1assica1 We1fare
Economlcs

Market fai1ures occur when vio1ations of
the assumptions of the competitive
framework 1ead to equ 工 1 工 br 工 a that are not
Pareto efficient

Administrative ru1es and
incentives to increase efficiency
of intra-organizationa1 markets:
solving organizationa1 pub1ic
good , common property resource ,
and natura1 monopo1y prob1ems

Neoinstitutiona1

Contracts structure the re1ationship
between principa1s and agents to minimize
agency cost , whiGh is the sum of the
costs of structuring , monitorin 弓 and
bonding contracts and the 10ss from
residua1 discretion

Organizationa1 design: creating
incentives for the production and
reve1ation of information that
improve the efficiency of intraand inter-organizationa1
transactions

工 nstitutiona1 arrangements economize on
transaction cost: the sum of pre 一 contract
bargaining and post-contract comp1iance
(opportunism) costs

Organizationa1 design: creating
hostages , bonds , and other
mechanisms for generating credib1e
commitment and discouraging

Econom 工 cS:

Agency Theory

Neoinstitutiona1
Econom 工 cS:

Transaction Cost Theory

opportun 工 sm

Socia1 Choice Theory

u

-l

Fι

﹒工

E工

o--

hn
os
cn
or y o
es
ntmtctTO

Socia1 choice ru1es are prone to
disequi1ibriumj institutiona1 structure
may induce equi1ibrium

Organizationa1 design and
po1itica1 strategy: obtaining
substantive outcomes through the
manipulation of procedura1 ru1es

工 nstitutions

Corporate cu1ture and leadership:
creating focal points for more
efficient organizational

gamesj

are equi1ibria in repeated
equilibria are rarely unique

已空空 ilibria

parties in any particular situation , may make their continued
application more credible.

This view of corporate culture

raises a number of interesting design questions.

For example ,

if it is important for an organization to have a single
corporate culture , then should the substantive jurisdictions
organiza 七 ions

of public

be limited so that the principles

comprising their corporate cultures will be appropriate for
dea 工 ing

with the types of unanticipated consequences they are

likely to face?
Though the practical consequences of interpreting
leadership and corporate culture in terms of repeated games
are not yet clear , we think that this approach provides a
promising conceptual foundation for generalizing about these
important but elusive phenomena.
[Table

工

about

here]

Conclusion
A variety of economic literatures , summarized in
inform organizational design.

Table

工，

The market failure framework ,

so central to welfare economics , can be easily applied to
diagnose , and perhaps remedy , commonly encountered
organizational problems.

The neoinstitutional literatures

focussing on agency and transaction costs bring theory a step
closer to providing
design.

practica 工

The social choice and

concepts

for organizational

institu 七 ional

theory

literatures offer deep conceptual foundations not only for
organizational design but also for some important aspects of
the executive function.

As these literatures are

continu 工 ng

to grow , they have prospects for offering more to public
34

management in the future.
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Endnotes

1.

Relaxing these assurnptions has both positive and norrnative

irnplications: it allows analysts to rnake predictions about the
consequences of

d 工 fferences

工n

institutional arrangernentsi it

also brings into question the interpretation of efficiency in
neoclassical welfare theory by treating institutional
arrangernents as a rnatter of choice rather than taking thern as
given (Bromley , 1989).

2.

For a discussion of

inforrna 七 ion

failure , see Vining and Weirner

asyrnrnetry as a rnarket

(工 988)

.

3. Neoinstitutional econornics can be thought of as a subset of
what has been called the "new institutional economics."

The

latter includes rnodels that relax the assumption of individual
rationality central to neoclassical econornic theory.
exarnple , Oliver Williamson

(工 985)

For

conceives of transaction

cost theory as broadly including bounded rationality and
therefore a part of the new institutional economics.

In this

essay , because of our definition of economics , we lirnit our
attention to that part of transaction cost theory that
preserves the assumption of individual rationality.

4. Empirical research in four areas -- corporate control ,
vertical integration , managerial compensation , and
organizational structure of corporations -- has been "mostly
confirmatory . "

See Hesterly , Liebeskind , and Zenger (1990)
36

for a review.

5.

In this framework , management involves monitoring the

execution of contracts and providing appropriate direction to
organizational members when unspecified contingencies arise.

6.

Elements of the model were introduced by Robert Wilson

(1968)

in the theory of syndicates and by

Richard Zeckhauser

(工 97 工

in

the 工 r

article

M 工 chael
on

8pence and

工 nsurance

and

information.

7. We are reminded of the story of the men in a balloon who
had become lost.
He responded:

They shouted to a man below:

"In a balloon."

"Where are we?"

They concluded he must be an

economist because he was precise but unhelpful.
formal principal-agent literature has been more

80 far , the
valuable

工n

providing precise specifications of a variety of information
asymme tries , such as hidden information and hidden action ,
than in informing practical issues of design.

8.

The relative efficiency of ' giving residual rights to the

various parties in situations of incomplete contracts provides
an explanation for ownership of assets in organizations.
Klein , Crawford , and Alchian (1978) and Grossman and Hart
(1986) .

9.

Robert Biller (1976)

advocated the establishment of

"savings banks" to allow carry-over of some fraction of
37

See

unspent funds to avoid the end of period rush to spend the
budget.

工 O.

For an excellent overview of spatial models , see Krehbiel

(工 988)

.

11. Viewing one of the committees as a agency , say controlling
the policy dimension corresponding to the speed of
implementat 工 on ，

prov 工 des

a way of thinking about the nature

and stability of administrative discretion (see

工 2.

Hill ，工 985)

.

For excellent overviews of this approach to the study of

institutions , see Calvert

(1995a ，工 995b)
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